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George F. Brown Jr.

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

AID AND ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING NATIONS

by

George F. Brown, Jr.

Introduction. Discussions on relations between the United States and other nations frequently and naturally gravitate to a consideration of problems and prospects involving our major post-World War II allies and adversaries—the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, the members of the NATO alliance, and Japan. More difficult and perplexing issues arise, however, when relations with the nations of the developing world are considered. Nonetheless, these questions retain a fundamental significance to long-term U.S. interests. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown noted in the *Fiscal Year 1980 Department of Defense Annual Report* that

> Many of the most serious international crises of the postwar era have arisen, not from . . . great global issues, but from regional threats and instabilities. Because the United States cannot escape worldwide involvement, our security and our defense needs are a function of these developments and of the success of our foreign policy in dealing with them.

In recent years questions relating to U.S. involvement in the developing world have been both illuminated and overshadowed by international events. The 1973 oil crisis focused attention on the essentiality of Third-World resources; the Panama Canal treaty debates displayed the complexity of the relationships between major and lesser powers; Soviet and Cuban intervention in Africa and elsewhere called attention to the growing ability of our adversaries to influence events in the developing world; the turmoil in Iran demonstrated the precarious stability of many developing nations. During the same period, however, other events (e.g., the dollar's decline and the U.S. balance of payments problems, increased perceptions of the threat to our interests in Western Europe, and national distaste for involvement in local conflicts stemming from our involvement in Vietnam) served to focus attention away from the problems of the developing nations. However, it remains clear that vital long-term U.S. economic, political, and security interests will be profoundly influenced by the evolution of U.S. relationships with them. In this paper, a

broad survey of the underlying issues is presented, and a range of policy options is examined and critiqued.

Background of the North-South Dialogue. While questions of economic development have traditionally occupied a place in international policy discussions, it is generally agreed that they moved to center stage around the time of the 1973 oil embargo. Among the far-reaching consequences of the embargo was its demonstration to the resource-rich nations of the South that they indeed had bargaining power with respect to the industrialized and resource dependent nations of the North. Several other events during this same time period magnified the impact of the embargo in focusing attention on questions of economic development. Problems of food shortages had come into international prominence. Population growth statistics caught the world's attention. Models such as those developed for the Club of Rome forecast general decay in the world's standard of living and suggested gloomy prospects for nations striving to match the standards of living in the industrialized nations. Disenchantment with international aid programs, similar to that which emerged in the United States regarding domestic poverty programs, emerged as statistics indicated that several decades of assistance had failed to solve the problem.

These various events led to the discussions of the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which ended in September 1975. While U.N. discussions on similar topics had been held regularly in the past, the Seventh Special Session can be regarded as unique in two respects: it was the first instance in which principal officials from the developed world actively participated, and it was the first such session during which serious negotiations took place. While the resolution that resulted from the session can be viewed as a patchwork of negotiated and compromised issues, the fact that *any* resolution emerged from the group was itself significant.

U.S. attention to the problems of the developing nations continued to be given priority for several years following the Seventh Special Session. During the 1976 campaign, the candidates of both parties addressed aid, assistance, and North-South relations in major foreign policy statements, with the Republicans noting the progress that had been made in this area following the oil embargo and the Democrats assailing the Administration for insensitivity to American interests within the developing world.

Recently, however, the question "Whatever happened to the North-South dialogue?" can legitimately be asked. In terms of attention given it in policy discussions and in the media, the problems of the developing world again have been relegated to the sidelines, replaced by concerns about the balance of payments, the declining dollar, competition from other developed world suppliers, etc. Excluding those developing nations that either supply oil or are the scenes of current military confrontations involving Soviet-backed forces, it is difficult to identify any present attention being devoted to the developing world.

Why Should the U.S. Concern Itself with the Developing Nations? The existence of a rationale for U.S. (and other developed nations) concern over the problems of the developing nations has been hotly debated since the first official assistance programs were initiated following World War II. In addition to frequently cited humanitarian reasons for attacking poverty and misery worldwide as well as at home, three bases for assistance can be identified: national security, international politics, and economics and commerce.

The national security rationale is certainly the most pervasive of the three, with its roots easily traced to such early programs as Lend-Lease (1941), the Truman Doctrine (1947), the Marshall Plan (1948), and the Point IV Program (1949). The three postwar programs each explicitly had as an objective the halting of the spread of communism within the free world. Among the frequently cited security arguments for assistance programs are the linkages between economic assistance and military alliances, the use of aid to secure critical overseas bases or other essential strategic requirements, the role of development in thwarting insurrections born in poverty, the role of development in promoting governmental stability, and the role of economic growth in allowing a nation to assume the burden of its own military defense against internal and external foes.

The international political arguments for developmental assistance can be traced to the postwar struggle between the world's two major political/economic systems. Broadly, assistance has been advocated as a tool for enabling developing nations to join a community of nations whose political interests and perspectives are compatible with those of the United States and her key industrial allies. The argument often cited was that evolutionary progress stemming from assistance can enable a nation to avoid the revolutionary changes advocated by the Marxists. Furthermore, economic progress was frequently cited as a key measure of success in the comparisons among clients of the opposing political economic systems, providing further impetus to assistance programs.

The economic arguments for developmental assistance can be traced to the traditional incentives present within a free enterprise system. Development improves market conditions; a developing nation presents substantial opportunities for productive overseas investments; developed nations can evolve into low-cost sources of supply, not only for raw materials, but also for intermediate products and finished goods. Such nations as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan provide recent examples of the economic incentives offered by developing nations. Additionally, the economic essentiality of developing nations as raw materials suppliers must again be noted.

Debate concerning developmental assistance has not centered so much on the validity of U.S. security, political, or economic objectives such as have been described above as it has on the value of assistance in achieving them. Any study of previous recipients of economic and military assistance must conclude that the results have been quite mixed; in some cases, aid can be validly praised for its contributions in achieving the goals that have been discussed, while in other nations the programs appear to have failed dismally. Even these assessments of success and failure shift rapidly over time: India, Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia, Iran, and other nations provide examples of this.

Viewing the present international situation, the following key conclusion emerges: U.S. security, political, and economic interests in the developing world are greater today than they have ever been. Recent years have seen the Soviet bloc aggressively entering into competition for resources, including food, raw materials, technology, oil, and strategic overseas allies. An entirely new dimension to their national interests—a dimension increasingly within their capabilities to influence—is thus suggested, one that leads many observers to suggest a reassessment of the traditional Third-World conflict scenarios. Severe strains have been placed on even the Atlantic/Japanese alliance as the result of resource dependencies and economic considerations involving the developing world. Shifts in regional power balances

as a result of successes and failures in development pose particularly delicate questions for each of the major powers. The vitality of the developed economies has been shown to be easily influenced by decisions of the developing nations. These and other factors that focus attention on the Third World show no signs of abating in the near future. A clear requirement for national debate regarding policies involving the developing world can be identified.

Assistance within the Larger Scheme. The importance of the developing world to the United States, however, in no way implies that policy choices will be easily arrived at or implemented. The mixed record alone of previous attempts at influencing the progress of economic development suggests the absence of easy answers. Several other factors critically affect policy choices.

First are the domestic economic situations within the United States and elsewhere in the industrialized world. A period of spotty economic growth, of rapid inflation, of budget cutting, and of unfunded domestic programs is hardly the ideal time to suggest new international initiatives. Virtually any program that can be contemplated has opportunity costs easily identified within the domestic economy—and pressure groups poised to suggest the implied trade-offs. It is clearly because of domestic economic considerations that few politicians have raised the existence of problems outside the borders.

Second among these factors is the continuing shifts among the developed economies themselves. In a very real sense, the U.S. balance of payments and foreign competition problems—as well as the dollar's reaction to them—can be considered the end product of an earlier developmental assistance program, namely the reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan. For the several decades following World War II, U.S. policies towards Europe and Japan were beneficent in the extreme. The direct grants under the Marshall Plan pale in importance when compared to the indirect aid provided by the United States in the forms of an overvalued dollar, liberal tariff policies, and financial market support, all of which served to make the U.S. market attractive for foreign producers. The present currency realignment can be broadly considered the end to these assistance programs. Nonetheless, the adjustment problem thus created presents other real problems for the United States and her industrial allies. In that these economic linkages are critical to overall economic progress, they will continue to occupy our attention for some time.

Third is the recent entry of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and, most recently, the People's Republic of China into the free-world economic structure. Until the 1970s, the centrally planned economies played virtually no part in the international economic system in which the United States and her allies participated. Their entry, to date only at a modest level but with significant growth potential, suggests another major adjustment with which international economic planners must contend. Because of the linkages between economic and political/military considerations, evolution of East-West economic relationships will also receive careful scrutiny.

These three factors suggest the possibility that problems of development will continue to rank low in the list of international economic priorities. In fact, it will take deliberate attention for them to escape from obscurity, given the competition.

What Do the Developing Nations Want? Bluntly, the developing nations want to develop; their leaders and people want to achieve standards of life similar to those they now regularly see portrayed in the industrialized nations

through the modern media. Towards this objective several mechanisms have emerged that tend to define the demands of the developing world. When separated from the rhetoric that typically accompanies such discussions, the shopping list can be reduced to five principal items:

- Financial resources. The developing nations clearly suggest the need for assistance, preferably without strings, in order to fund programs necessary for development.
- Removal of the burdens of the past. Primarily, this translates to the need to get out from the burden of interest and principal payments on debts previously accrued.
- Price supports for primary products. In that primary products have continued to be the mainstay of most developing economies and that prices of primary products have recently lagged behind those of agricultural, manufactured, and petroleum products, price rises and stability are seen as essential in ensuring the vitality of the existing economic bases within the Third World.
- Diversification and industrialization. Generally, this requirement is manifested in terms of demands that industrial relocation occur to bring manufacturing enterprises closer to the raw materials supplier. Technology transfer and manpower training issues are frequently described as prerequisites to this.
- Sovereignty over their own economic futures. This demand is linked frequently to former colonial relationships and to developed-nation multinational firms.

Within each of these five general categories, a wide variety of specific requests from the developing nations can be identified. Among the most familiar of these specific proposals are such items as institutionalizing developmental assistance from the industrialized nations at a level equal to 0.7 percent of gross national product, creating special drawing rights for the developing nations within the International Monetary Fund as an automatic source of financial transfers, canceling certain longstanding debts of Third World nations, indexing primary product price levels to those of the products exported by the industrialized nations, creating commodity buffer stocks to ensure access and price stability, and preferential tariff and quota treatment for semifinished and manufactured products exported by the developing nations.

What Options Might be Pursued by the Developed Nations? Previous responses to demands such as those described in the previous section have varied widely over time and across the developing nations. The Swiss and Swedes, for example, have recently canceled certain debts of less developed nations, and many European nations provide aid at approximately the 0.7 percent level. Initiatives begun in 1975 were aimed at increasing the financial reserves of the U.N. based assistance agencies. Various agencies and institutes have been created in recent years to facilitate technology transfer and to dampen oscillations in primary product price levels. Emergency food assistance programs have been expanded recently. On the other hand, other proposals, such as those for price indexing, have been generally rejected by the developing nations, and the concept of trade preferences has been discussed only in terms of linkages with supply assurance. Overall, the problems of development have been addressed in at best a piecemeal fashion, with little in the way of a focused program emerging. While the problems of creating and gaining acceptance for any such program are difficult, the following policy options are among those that must be considered in blending a program within these problems.

- Do nothing. This option, which perhaps best reflects the current policy,

has both strengths and weaknesses. On the positive side, two factors are apparent. First is the likelihood that the developing nations will be unable to bring anything stronger than verbal harassment to bear upon the developed world; only the remote possibility that the developing nations will convince the OPEC nations to use their oil weapon militates against this assessment. Second is the fact that doing nothing is the cheapest policy, at least over the short term. The first argument against doing nothing is the strong possibility that a series of localized crises will emerge requiring response from the industrialized world; reacting in a noncrisis situation has certain advantages that might be worth preserving. Second is that inaction by the industrial democracies may invite further Soviet initiatives within the developing world. Finally, the absence of action may lead to initiatives on the part of developing nations themselves inimical to U.S. interests; nationalization and supply disruption come most readily to mind. Generally, the arguments against doing nothing revert back to the discussion of the objectives towards which assistance programs might be oriented; while many argue the tenuous connection between assistance and achievement of these objectives, the linkage is certainly clear when a policy of neglect is considered.

- Accede, at least to some degree, to the demands of the developing nations. While this option will clearly appear the favorite of the developing nations, three factors require analysis before any case can be made in its favor. First is that even a complete accession to their requests may not produce the desired results, at least within the near future. Development is at best a slow process, and recent examples have clearly demonstrated the difficulties inherent in attempts to speed it along. Second is that such a program will be expensive, measured in resource terms or in terms of opportunity costs to the developed nations. Third, any attempts at restructuring the international economic system in order to speed the process of development in the Third World will add to the chaos already present in this system as a result of the first-world realignment and the entry of the centrally planned economies. These three factors suggest the need for careful scrutiny of any program proposals that might emerge from future discussions; at minimum, because such programs are likely to be both costly and disruptive, there is a need for analysis to determine the worth of the benefits that might accrue from them.

- Rely on the international business community. The concept of using existing commercial enterprises as the vehicle for the implementation of development has swung widely in world public opinion forums. U.S. policy itself has ranged from programs designed to encourage such actions on the part of its own multinationals to programs designed to stifle overseas investments. On the part of the developing nations, economic and political considerations collide when this option is raised. While virtually every study has concluded that host nations benefit economically from the presence of multinationals, at the same time virtually every less-developed nation has expressed the belief that these same multinationals have meddled in their internal affairs and made decisions contrary to the host country's national interests. Within the developed nations, the debate regarding this option closely parallels debates regarding domestic social programs; the underlying question about the proper roles of private enterprise and government becomes the central issue requiring resolution. The record of success in development enjoyed by the multinationals, along with the free enterprise philosophical underpinnings of the industrial democracies, provides a strong rationale for further consideration of options within this category.

• Transfer the responsibility for developmental assistance. For the United States, there are three possible candidates upon whom the burden of assistance might be foisted: the former colonial powers of Europe, the centrally planned economies, and the suddenly rich oil exporting nations. With respect to the first, questions of capability and of the inevitable indirect linkages to the United States emerge. With respect to the second group, which has largely operated outside international developmental assistance programs, the trade-off between security considerations and funding availability is obvious. The Soviets to date have carefully attempted to shun any responsibility for providing assistance on other than a *quid pro quo* basis. With respect to the third group, the question of incentives arises even for those nations whose oil reserves are not already tied to domestic development programs. Overall, this option appears to offer only limited regional possibilities. In the end it is likely that the principal burden for program initiation and funding will fall upon the United States; however, linkages with other nations may arise as vehicles for mitigating some of the costs and other effects of assistance programs.

• Expand the roles of international organizations involved with developmental assistance. There are numerous considerations to weigh in evaluating options that employ international, as opposed to bilateral, mechanisms. On the positive side, use of international organizations takes some of the burden from each individual participant, and simultaneously encourages broader participation in any programs initiated. Additionally, choices can be made that place part of the burden on the developing nations themselves, either in terms of management responsibility or of restrictions preconditioning the receipt of aid. Channeling aid through international organizations also might be viewed as a means of lessening the inevitable comparisons across recipient nations regarding donor nation concern. On the negative side, the linkages between aid and developing nation concessions (e.g., base rights, resource access) that have traditionally characterized assistance programs would be weakened by any movement towards international control. Choices among which nations deserve assistance would similarly be further removed from each donor nation's policy councils. Finally, there is the question of the effectiveness of international organizations in solving development problems. Studies of World Bank programs show the same mixed performance that characterizes any donor nation's individual programs.

• Encourage the development of regional alliances. The lesson of the European Economic Community might be drawn upon in formulating further assistance programs: regional economic alliances can be viewed as one mechanism for overcoming the problems inherent in smallness. In that many developing nations are too small in terms of population, market size, resource availability, and other measures to support many industries often linked to the industrialization process, the growth of regional confederations offers a possible solution. To date, however, such efforts have met with only the most limited successes, mainly because of political and cultural obstacles to cooperation. These types of constraints will likely persist and prove a challenge to any programs designed towards the end of encouraging regional cooperation. A near cousin of this category of policy options is the development of regional powers through concentrated assistance programs designed to allow one nation rapid and effective growth. This policy has been followed in an almost explicit fashion in recent years. There are two areas requiring further thought in this respect: how does the designated regional power positively influence development elsewhere in the region,

contributing to both growth and stability, and to what extent do such policies stifle, rather than encourage, competition and rivalry in the region, the factors which have basically limited the success of outright attempts at economic alliances. If the focus on regional powers is to achieve results more broadly based than within the single nation itself, these underlying questions require consideration as part of the policy decisions.

• Expand the opportunities for developing nations to export to U.S. markets. The U.S. consumer has historically been a critical stimulus to the growth of foreign economies: the reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan and the development of the Korean and Taiwanese economies have depended fundamentally on U.S. appetites for the products of those nations. A similar impetus to the growth of other developing nations could be provided by preferential tariff policies and other measures designed to widen the opportunities for such nations to compete in U.S. markets. Such considerations are certain to be high in the list of priorities of the developing nations during the current rounds of negotiations regarding international trade and tariff policy. Questions of preferential treatment for the products of developing nations are virtually certain to surface. Three difficulties exist with this proposal. First, such actions would certainly complicate already difficult U.S. balance of payments problems. Secondly, the domestic industries and labor groups likely to be harmed by increased foreign competition would intensify their lobbying for protection. Finally, similar lobbying on an international scale would likely occur from the other nations whose shares in the U.S. market would be adversely affected by such measures.

• Provide assistance in the form of security assurance. In that national security is itself one of the primary objectives of assistance programs, security assistance programs (including direct support through alliances, grants and aid, technical and training support, and arms transfers) remain an important policy option that can affect not only security itself, but also broader political and economic goals. Certainly the primary successes of previous developmental efforts, including the reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan and the development of the Korean, Taiwanese, and Israeli economies, have been cases in which U.S. security assistance has played a major role. In each of these cases security assistance programs served not only to protect the nations involved from internal and external threats, but also freed their domestic resources from defense requirements and allowed them to be applied to other national purposes. Japan particularly stands as an example of the economic assistance provided by the U.S. military umbrella. On the other hand, however, equally numerous examples exist of nations for which the receipt of U.S. assistance failed to serve the long-term national interests for which it was designed; Vietnam and, and more recently, Iran serve as examples. While the need of developing nations to insure their own security and stability remains a fundamental prerequisite to growth and development, several problems must be addressed in considering policy options within this category. First, of course, is again the cost of security assistance; opportunity costs of defense itself, as well as costs outside defense, suggest the need for carefully weighing military assistance programs. Second is public concern with involvement in the military affairs of Third World nations; residual concerns stemming from the conflicts in Southeast Asia remain a major impediment to such involvement, even to the extent of providing advisors and weaponry. Third is the possibility that U.S. military involvement, either directly or indirectly, in the affairs of

developing nations may serve to focus dissident elements not only against the United States, but also against the host government. To the extent that this occurs, one of the primary security objectives is itself thwarted. A final factor that must be weighed, as recently demonstrated in Iran, is the need for a developing nation to carefully balance its military growth with other societal requirements. Funds spent on defense (and also scarce national resources such as trained personnel allocated to the armed forces) are withdrawn from the civilian sectors of the economy, and thus represent, at least in the short term, a detriment to overall economic progress.

Conclusions. The problems of economic development, after a short period of international attention, have returned to the too-hard-to-handle category. Domestic economic considerations and realignments within the international economic community have focused attention away from the developing nations except in a few isolated instances. At the same time, the importance of the Third World to the United States and its industrial allies has grown to unprecedented levels along economic, political, and security dimensions. Not only have superpower rivalries regarding the Third World intensified, but competition among traditional free world allies has emerged as a result of recent developments and from the recognition of the criticality of resource suppliers. All of these factors suggest the need for a renewed look at the issues underlying the North-South debate.

Decisions regarding economic assistance programs sponsored by the United States and other industrialized nations are complicated by many factors. The mixed record of previous programs leads to uncertainty regarding the effect of assistance on the achievement of national objectives. Competition from other programs, domestically and internationally, makes assistance a ready candidate for deferral. Each of the options that might be blended into an overall program has its individual strengths and weaknesses, many of which are only imperfectly understood. No obvious candidate program emerges in terms of either the predictability of its results or the likelihood of gaining national consensus on its worth.

Furthermore, the success of policy options pursued by the United States and other developed nations will depend fundamentally upon the parallel policies of the developing nations themselves: their success in controlling population growth and their ability to stimulate domestic investment, for example, will have dramatic effects on the results of policies implemented by the donor nations. Nonetheless, questions of aid and assistance such as have been raised in the previous sections of this paper are ones that should be advanced for further analysis and national debate. While there are no easy answers nor any rapid solution to the problems of underdevelopment, the option of ignoring them is one that has profound and disturbing long-term implications for the economic and political health, as well as the security, of the United States.

MILITARY ETHICS IN THE UNITED STATES: CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY

by

Paul R. Schratz

and

Francis X. Winters, S.J.*

One dimension of professional ethics is frequently overlooked in the search for morally acceptable standards of conduct for the U.S. military profession. That is the need to overcome the separation between the military and civilian sectors of American society that inhibits and impairs public debate about national security policy. The military commander in the field earns his position because he has the mental strength and moral power to enable him to dominate the battlefield. Off the field that responsibility carries civic obligations as well.

The military professional in a democratic society has a significant moral obligation to participate in the debate on public policy in order to sharpen the discussion by adding a perspective of informed opinion and experience. The prevailing assumption, widely shared among military professionals themselves, holds that the U.S. Constitution requires silence from the military on crucial issues of foreign policy.[1] On the contrary, participation in foreign policy debate by the military officer is not only constitutionally acceptable but is morally obligatory. In developing and bringing his views to bear in debate on national security issues, the moral obligation of the officer in a democratic society differs little from that of the diplomat. One concentrates on ends of policy, the other on means; the responsibility for an effective national policy that supports the national ethic within available resources is the responsibility of both.

In order to counteract the dangerous assumption that the military should avoid participation in public discussions of foreign policy, we will examine: (1) the ethical responsibilities of U.S. officers; (2) the historic and constitutional case for military participation in public policy debate; and (3) some practical measures that officers might take—not without some risk to career advancement—to meet the ethical requirements proposed.

Ethics for U.S. Officers. Ethics is a prospective discipline, looking ahead rather than backward. It plans the future rather than laments the past. But it is important to study major political decisions of the past, such as the World War II decision to demand unconditional surrender and, subsequently, to drop the atomic bomb.[2] These are interesting historic questions and they point to stark failures of moral and political, and even military imagination (foresight) on the part of Allied leaders in planning for the postwar world. If, in fact, conduct of the war were not keyed to a specific vision of a postwar world, one may ask, what was sought by force of arms on the battlefield?

Ethics must begin with remembrance. But it cannot end there. As a

*Dr. Schratz is Professor of Military Strategy at the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base. Father Winters is Director of the Institute for the Study of Ethics and International Affairs, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.

prospective or planning discipline, it looks forward and asks questions such as, "What should we do if the U.S.S.R. initiates nuclear war?" The answer does not come readily.

Dealing with the future when we deal with ethics nonetheless ties us with the past, specifically with our political past as Americans. For we are discussing here not only a general question about ethics and the military profession but specifically the ethics of the U.S. military profession and ethical standards appropriate for it. We and our military services exist in a historical context that, to some extent, defines the nature of our ethical response. That is, our political responses must conform to the general outlines of the political philosophy prescribed in the U.S. Constitution and in such documents as *The Federalist* papers that further illuminate the political heritage. That heritage, though drawn from Western Europe and exhibiting similarities to political systems in Europe, is no less distinctly American in character. We must act as Americans, therefore, as a people imbued with a specific political heritage.

The Heritage of Military Participation in Public Policy Debate. The ethical guidelines enshrined in the Constitution constitute a system of shared power generally known as checks and balances. Our political heritage is based on the philosophy that power is enhanced and the danger of uncontrolled power mitigated by diffusion among a number of centers of initiative.[3] It rests on the need for popular participation in decisionmaking and it looks forward to the prospect of creative conflict among the competing factions, interests and opinions that are inevitable in society. Ours is a nation that prospers only if there is continuous public argument. Indeed, one observer has defined the free society as "men locked together in argument."[4]

Attention to the political context of ethics is crucial because there remains a widespread misconception, inherited from predemocratic societies, that military ethics is a matter of obeying (or, for the elites, of issuing) just commands. Unfortunately, most treatments of military professional ethics begin and end there—with an examination of mutual obligations of the various persons within the chain of command.[5] All of this analysis is very important and has been too widely neglected. Yet such an approach to professional obligations is deficient precisely because it ignores the contemporary political situation of the decisionmaker, namely, his citizenship in a democratic society. It ignores the fact that in this society the military commander is supposed to participate in the determination of what these commands should be. The soldier as citizen must do more than issue commands and oversee their execution. He must involve himself in the arduous process of determining the structure of U.S. strategy. Only on the basis of a sound strategic posture can the commander undertake the more immediate task of command.

Ethical responsibility for the American military commander is much more extensive than it was in the somewhat simpler era of monarchies. In the United States, the soldier as a citizen also is sovereign, that is, he shares the responsibility of determining—on moral as well as political and military grounds—a sound foreign policy. He cannot simply accept the existing foreign policy of his nation and proceed to execute the military dimensions of it; he cannot create a defense structure that is not intimately, actively and creatively related to the goals of foreign policy. Participating in the process of determining the *goals* of U.S. foreign and military policy is as important as participating in developing the *means* underlying those goals. There can be no hiatus between political and military planning. The military must become a faction in the sense advocated for all groups of U.S. citizens in *The Federalist* papers.

Professional military responsibility can be exercised in this fashion only by first overcoming the current separation of civilian and military sectors in our society so as to achieve a new integration of politics and strategy.

The reluctance of the military to participate fully in the process of policymaking finds its inception in what is generally understood by the term "civilian control of the military" and the unique concept of civil-military relations in the United States. Huntington sees the separation of powers between Congress and the Executive as "a perpetual invitation, if not an irresistible force, drawing military leaders into political conflicts."[6] These conflicts, however, focus on weapons, technology and budget, rarely on policy. The danger is less the domination of policy by military views than deficiencies in policy made in the absence of military views. The essence is a broader conceptual framework within which all participants in the policy process may contribute. Specialists in policy discussions—military, political, economic, or whatever—are advocates. But the military leader, reluctant to exercise a "political" role, limits himself to only the military aspects of a problem as more properly his concern and thereby contributes to strategic difficulties that prevent conceiving force in other than military terms. As General Marshall expressed it, thinking of political problems in military terms soon makes them military problems. War becomes a contest of logistics rather than of politics.

On the civilian side, important political consequences inextricably imbedded in strategically important events are isolated from policy as "purely military matters"; national goals are subordinated to military expediency. Political leaders have rarely understood fully the role—and limitations—of military power in seeking the ends of policy. Military leaders, though dominant in the staffing process, rationalize the lack of full participation in *policymaking* as legitimate—if misguided—deference to the principle of civilian control of the military. Yet civilian control in itself carries no such connotation of isolation for either the diplomat or the warrior. The result, therefore, is an enigma of policy devoid of military participation yet dominated by military considerations.

In Vietnam, for example, in the critical stage of the war—the Kennedy and early Johnson eras—U.S. policy sought to apply a conventional military solution to an essentially political problem in which insurgency was only one symptom of underlying political causes. Dependence on military power neglected the crucial political dimension that was always the principal determinant of the outcome. Having opted for a major military role, the second error was failure to use sufficient military power in pursuit of objectives. Had civilian leaders shown greater willingness to use the military power at their disposal, U.S. policy would have enjoyed a greater measure of credibility, an increased possibility of suppressing the insurgency, and of resolution of the conflict within the limited aims of U.S. policy.

The first error represented a failure to understand the essentially political nature of the conflict; the second a failure of the civilian leaders to understand the use of military force once committed to a political problem. Better integration of military means with the aims of policy by civilian or military planners would have made success possible, by both would have made success likely. Both errors illustrate the central problem of civil-military relations, the failure to understand the decisive fundamental of statecraft, the integral relationship between foreign policy and military power.[7]

Deference to military advice dominated by "purely military considerations" contributed to overmilitarizing an essentially political problem, to

countering a complicated national revolution with conventional field tactics, and to measuring success in the field in engineering rather than in political terms.

Some may claim that broader participation by the military in the policy process leads to domination of policy by military considerations, even to the point of substantial takeover of the government. Yet the record indicates the contrary. Throughout its history the United States has been uniquely free of any reason to fear a coup by its military. Its uniformed leaders have invariably displayed a proper spirit of subordination to duly established civilian authority. At no time did the officer corps represent a threat of the kind that restored de Gaulle to power in France or that troubles so many countries in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East. With varying degrees of influence of military counsel, key national security decisions are made by civilian authority: the decision to build a hydrogen bomb, the decision to rearm U.S. and allied forces, the decision to emphasize nuclear power in the 1950s, the decision to invest heavily in early warning defenses but not in bomb shelters, the decision to strengthen conventional and counterguerrilla forces in the 1960s. Civilian leaders called the turn on ABM, the B-1 and called it in Korea, the Formosa Strait, Dien Bien Phu, Suez, Lebanon, the Congo, Cuba, Cambodia, Tonkin Gulf, Hanoi, Luanda and the repeated crises in the Middle East. The rare instances of insubordination have been individual disagreements and not organized conspiracies. The MacArthur-Truman dispute, for example, was a challenge by the commander in the field to the strategic direction of the war, but the challenge was to his military chiefs and the President, not to the political control of the nation.

Civil and military power in the U.S. system was deliberately balanced by the Founders, one against the other, and fused in the person of the President. The status of the armed forces under "civilian" authority stems from the dual personality of the Chief Executive in the Constitution as both a civil and military official. There is no mandate that specifically places the military subordinate to civil authority; it is a heritage that finds expression only in the multiplicity of offices held by the Chief Executive. The President as a civilian is the Commander in Chief; as an elected official, he is subject to the control of the people. The fundamental principles involve popular power over both the President and the military, balanced or shared power between all the branches of the government, and military effectiveness despite the checks and balances. This is not civilian control over the military as much as it is a balance of civil and military authority with a fulcrum held by the chief of state.

Civilian control over the military, except through the legislature, was explicitly rejected by our Founders. The framers of the Constitution were more afraid of military power in the hands of politicians than they were of political power in the hands of the military. To a man they visualized Gen. George Washington as the first President. They were certainly aware he was a military officer. Their concern was less how he would carry out his civilian duties than how his successors would carry out the military function as Commander in Chief. Charles Pinckney of South Carolina had proposed that "the military shall always be subordinate to the civil power." This was stricken—the Constitution did not, in fact, provide for civilian control. But the remainder of his plan, for control over the military through the purse strings, was adopted in revised form.[8] In short, the Commander in Chief clause, insofar as operational authority over military forces is concerned, seems to be designed no more to provide than to prevent civilian control over the military.

Despite participation of both civilian and military officials in most, if not all, phases of the policy process, the military leadership has traditionally isolated itself from its role in the policy process. After the Bay of Pigs crisis, President Kennedy, unimpressed by JCS advice, specifically cautioned the Chiefs against limiting their counsel to "purely military considerations," a directive reiterated by each of his successors. The basic and fundamental isolation of power and policy in the American value system is deeply imbedded, however, especially among older and more senior participants. Integrated staffs have not produced integrated planning. It is at the operational level that a new approach to truly unified politico-military planning is clearly needed, not only as the natural development of the U.S. national security organization, but as the extremely important direction of change for the military in its own interest. Years before attaining the responsibility of public office, Henry Kissinger said,

> A separation of strategy and policy can be achieved only to the detriment of both. It causes military power to be identified with the most absolute applications of power and it tempts diplomacy into an overconcern with finesse. Since the difficult problems of national policy are in the area where political, economic, psychological and military factors overlap, we should give up the fiction that there is such a thing as "purely" military advice.[9]

Kissinger visualized the day, as we do herein, where "At every stage of formulation of strategy, doctrine would be considered as a combination of political, economic and military factors replacing the present system which seeks to compromise two incommensurables, 'purely' military and 'purely' political considerations."[10] Lacking such a doctrinal framework, the military leader becomes a technician and not a strategist, a weaponeer and not a warrior.

Some Practical Measures to Achieve the Reintegration of Civilian and Military Planning and Some Possible Career Consequences. The important aspect of ethics considred here is the obligation imposed on the military professional by his U.S. citizenship to participate in the public debate on public policy, not excluding national security policy. How would a military professional go about fulfilling these obligations? What measures could he adopt to exercise his moral responsibility to sharpen, and so to shape, the public argument on defense policy? Three avenues of participation may be suggested that will in varying degrees and by complementary strategies bring to bear his professional competence and experience on the public argument of defense policy: (1) intra- and interservice advocacy of sound military policies keyed to national goals; (2) military-Congressional dialogue; and (3) writing and speaking in civilian as well as military fora on foreign policy. A few words on each of these strategies may suggest opportunities for influencing the public debate as well as drawing attention to some of the career risks involved in exercising the professional responsibility proposed herein. Dissent, after all, has a unique role in American tradition that outsiders often find difficult to understand.

A nation born in revolution finds dissent a more wholesome emotion than in a society with a different heritage. The signatories of the Declaration of Independence held certain truths to be self-evident. But behind that statement lay an assumption that every American was capable of perceiving these truths for himself; that each bore an individual responsibility to his government. Different individuals have different moral apprehensions, some allowing widely divergent interpretations of the obliga-

tions they share. Widely varying opinions are no less with us today on major issues of policy; indeed no democracy is fully alive without such a debate. The question is the degree to which dissent is taken and the country's need for unity at the time.[11]

Thomas Jefferson theorized on the virtue of an occasional revolution and the necessity of watering the tree of liberty with the blood of patriots. Jefferson worried over the stern measures taken against the Pennsylvania farmers in the Whiskey Rebellion and the Massachusetts farmers in Shay's rebellion. "To punish these errors too severely," he said, "would be to suppress the only safeguard of the public liberty."

Toleration of opposition to national policy, however, has not ordinarily been extended to its military spokesmen. Legitimate dissent in a military organization gratifies the soul of the dissenter but has few other rewards even when successful. Spirited and energetic support of a position within the command, which is not shared by the commander, has been known to make for a lively but foreshortened career. The necessity for full obedience to a lawful order demands conformity in execution but breeds conformity in planning as well. It is a rare senior who welcomes dissent at all, far less one who can display the placidity of a Thomas Jefferson in welcoming dissent merely to keep the spark of freedom alive.

The military commander reaches his decision not by such democratic principles as majority rule and protection of minority rights. He alone is responsible for the consequences, and he decides accordingly. When he advises the civilian leadership of the nation, however, he is less responsible for the ultimate consequences because no such clear-cut lines of authority exist. Nevertheless, among senior military leaders, the spark of legitimate dissent is still too easily smothered. Not only does the system impress conformity, but agreement is stressed to a point that substance itself may often be sacrificed to the necessity of reaching agreed language. The written word is "waffled" to accommodate divergent views in deliberate ambiguity.

Both within his service branch, where the officer is often called upon to study alternative policy options and to make recommendations of one or another course of action, and in the senior councils where joint service policies are established, the military professional can exercise a great deal of influence on public debate by informing himself thoroughly of the political, strategic, economic and social consequences of various policy options. Because the only purpose of military power is to serve the ends of policy, in truth he can do no less.

If individual officers are to exercise, at comparatively senior levels, the imagination required to see beyond the bureaucratic interest of their own branch of service, to see the military sector of our society as a whole and to assimilate the perspectives of civilian society and of the leaders of other nations, not only will the policy debate be enhanced but intra- and interservice debates on policy may also become more productive, more politically sensitive and consequently more wise. The instinct to leave the metamilitary matters to officers at a higher level, to the civilian leadership, or to other departments or branches of the government, or even to the pressure of Allies, has frequently proven to be shortsighted or mistaken. One is never sure that one or all of these other actors will in fact consider all the alternatives. While such "think piece" papers may at first be extremely unpopular within a particular branch, or even among representatives of other services, they may provide an indispensable contribution to formulating a wiser policy for the nation. One cannot expect, nor should the structure of decision demand, that civilian

thinkers have a sufficient grasp of military affairs to comprehend the full range of military options available to the executive.

A coequal level of the national security debate occurs at the level of congressional committees. When officers are appointed to serve as witnesses before congressional committees, they are initially obliged to represent official policy. If such a policy were ethically repugnant to the officer he would, of course, be morally obliged to refuse the task of representation and to accept the consequences of refusal. In most cases, however, he will be in agreement, or at least not in substantial *moral* disagreement, with the policy. If, in the course of representing a policy option that he personally judges to be less wise or efficient, but still morally acceptable, he is asked by a Congressman whether he *personally* agrees with the proposal, he is morally obliged to discharge his moral obligation and offer his own view, presented as such. The law specifically provides both the means and the obligation. While many professional and personal circumstances would have to be weighed before making such a decision, there are situations in which an officer would be morally obliged to offer a personal view different from the service or joint-service option. In such circumstances his obligation to express his own opinion arises from the legislative need to understand the various policy options available. The cognizant law, though castigated by President Eisenhower as "legalized insubordination," supports testimony derived from military spokesmen as an indispensable aid to the exercise of legislative responsibility.[12] The public debate, in other words, may require an awareness on the part of Congress of a militarily respectable difference of opinion on a critical issue of public policy.

A clarification is appropriate here. Many an officer who wishes to express dissent from public policy may feel obliged—or may be encouraged—to take off the uniform and pursue his protest from retirement. However noble the sentiment, no such suggestion can be endorsed herein. The record of officers who retired in order to make their dissent public is wholly unencouraging. Gen. Maxwell Taylor is a rare exception.

Finally, there may be a further forum in which the military officer may be allowed or even obliged to express dissent, always excepting that his official position as executor allows no choice but wholehearted support of approved policy. That forum, or more correctly, those fora, would be constituted by the various media of public debate on foreign policy, including professional journals of the various war colleges and institutes, the national magazines and news journals, professional conventions, associations, and the lecture platform. On matters of such great public significance as strategic policy, planning for the defense of Europe, wars of intervention in developing regions of the world, anti-terrorist operations and the like, it would be remarkable if there were no difference of opinion within the military corresponding to the range of views evident in the civilian professional community. If such a diversity of opinion exists in the officer corps, there may be times when it is incumbent on those who hold minority views to express their opinion in the appropriate medium. Once again, the public may be dependent on an awareness of differing but respectable military views in order to make progress in its own responsibility to adopt a wise foreign policy.

Merely to mention the levels of responsible dissent for an officer suggests the risks involved in the conscientious execution of any professional responsibility. The officer, no less than the doctor, lawyer or clergyman, has responsibilities to society at large that may conflict with personal career advancement. His ethics include an

obligation to contribute to public debate on foreign policy by articulating his views both within and outside the military services, as occasion demands. The likelihood that such responsibility may arrest or hazard a promising military career simply underlines the importance and dignity of the military profession itself, an integral factor in national well-being. The civilian leadership depends on and must defend the right of officers to contribute their perspective and advantages of study and experience in the art of warfare, including the limitation and prevention of war. It is precisely because civilian society is so dependent on the military that it rightly holds high expectations of the integrity of the military professional to declare himself even at the risk of career development.[13] The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal reached conclusions in large part based on the principle that the professional military defendants should have followed not the orders of Hitler but of their consciences. Those instances, even in the extreme and at direct peril to one's survival, are the occasions when the refusal of a military man to comply is not insubordinate but positively his legal and moral duty. In John F. Kennedy's words, "A man does what he must—in spite of personal consequences, obstacles and pressures—and that is the basis of all human morality."

NOTES

1. This assumption seems to underlie the learned article by Robert S. Poydasheff, "Military Justice: A Reinforcer of Discipline," *Naval War College Review*, Winter 1976, cf. especially pp. 78, 81.

2. Ethical and political perspectives on these decisions can be found in the works of George F. Kennan, e.g., *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 101-103; *Memoirs* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), v. I, pp. 309-310; and *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961), pp. 366-368.

3. Jacob E. Cooke, ed., *The Federalist* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), #10, pp. 60, 63, 64; #51, pp. 349-353; and #63, p. 423.

4. John Courtney Murray, S.J., *We Hold These Truths* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960), p. 6, citing Thomas Gilby, O.P., *Between Community and Society* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1953).

5. A welcome exception is the thoughtful essay, based on long experience in military life by Kermit Johnson, "Ethical Issues of Military Leadership," *Parameters*, v. IV, no. 2, 1974, pp. 35-39.

6. See Samuel F. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p. 177.

7. See M.A. Pudlo, "The Double Imperative: U.S. Civil-Military Relations and the Vietnam War, 1961-1963," Unpublished manuscript, University of Lancaster.

8. The U.S. Constitution was modeled after the British constitutional arrangements to control the military, but the British Constitution, being unwritten, proved much more flexible. The U.K. Constitution today provides for extremely effective civilian political control and military planning within the Cabinet; the U.S. Constitution is frozen in an 18th-century model.

9. Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), p. 422.

10. *Ibid.*

11. See Sir Peter Ramsbotham, "Thoughtful Dissent: A Cornerstone of Democracy," Commencement Address, University of Maryland, College Park, 20 June 1976.

12. For complete text see *The New York Times*, 28 May 1958, p. 3. See also *Navy Magazine*, October 1958, p. 46.

13. See Johnson.